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ALTERNATIVES TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PHENOMENON: DAMAGE LIMITATIONS,
MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANELS AND
COUNTERSUITS
When a physician offers his professional services, he subjects him-
self to the possibility of facing a lawsuit for medical malpractice.1
Since the first reported American medical liability case in 1794,2
physicians have been held to a standard of care that reflects reason-
able skill and learning exercised by other members of the profession
following the same school of medical thought and practicing in the
same general locality.3 The number of malpractice actions brought by
dissatisfied patients against members of the medical profession has
been rapidly increasing.4 Among the reasons attributed to this in-
' Medical malpractice is defined as the "wreaking of bodily harm by virtue of
neglect, abandonment, or the omission or commission of certain actions which fall
below the standards of the average medical practitioner." Brooke, Medical Malprac-
tice: A. Socio-Economic Problem from a Doctor's View, 6 WILLAMErrE L. J. 225, 225
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Brooke]. See Brant, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The
Disease and How to Cure it, 6 VAL. U. L. REv. 152 (1972). The possibility of a doctor
being subjected to a medical malpractice suit has increased in recent years. In Virginia,
for example, the number of claims per 100 doctors rose from 2.6 in 1969 to 7.2 in 1975.
Average jury awards per claim in Virginia increased from $4,182.03 in 1969 to
$10,190.66 in 1975. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
IN VIRGINIA: THE SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 19
(1975) [hereinafter cited as S.C.C.].
2 Cross v. Guthrey, 11 Conn. (2 Root) 90 (1794). See Stetler, The History of
Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEMP. L. Q. 366, 367 (1957).
3 Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1971); Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d
53, 56 (10th Cir. 1964); Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568, 570 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1973); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 559 (1959). Plaintiffs in malpractice actions are required to prove that the physi-
cian's conduct did not conform to the customary practice of the medical profession. 1
D. LouIsELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 8.04 (1973). See Note, The Role
of Custom in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 55 B.U. L. REV. 647 (1975). A plaintiff
in a medical malpractice action is relieved of this aspect of his burden of proof when
"the results of medical treatment are so patently obvious as to be manifest to lay
persons." Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488, 493 (1967). See e.g., Wharton
v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235, 237-38 (1913) (12-inch metal spring lost in
patient's uterus).
Recently, courts have strayed from strict compliance with the locality rule. In
cases concerning specialists, courts have not only used the locality rule but have also
used the "same general neighborhood" rule and the "average specialist" rule. The
"same general neighborhood" rule establishes a higher standard than the locality rule
by comparing practices within a wider geographical area than the defendant physi-
cian's community, thus exposing his standard of care to another community which
1179
1180 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
crease are the expansion of professional liability insurance, a greater
public awareness of medical advances without a corresponding reali-
zation of the continued inexactness of medicine, a general increase
in all kinds of personal injury claims, and the erosion of the personal
physician-patient relationship because of increased medical speciali-
zation.5 In addition, there has been a legislative6 and judicial' liberali-
may be larger and have better access to advanced medical facilities. See, e.g., Camp-
bell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970). The "average specialist" rule imposes an
even higher standard of care based on the present level of knowledge within a particu-
lar specialized field and is not dependent on any geographical boundaries. See, e.g.,
Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972).
Additional changes concerning a physician's standard of care in regard to the
"average specialist" rule are reflected in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d
981 (1974). In Helling, testimony by medical experts established that the defendant
physicians' conduct in treating the plaintiff's eye problems met the standard of care
of the average specialist in the same field of medicine. Id. at 982. Nevertheless, the
court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants were liable for the plaintiff's injuries
because it is ultimately the court who must determine the degree of care required. Id.
at 983. In effect, the Helling court created its own standard of care. By abandoning
the traditional standards, Helling is believed by many commentators to indicate a
trend toward strict liability in medical malpractice. See Comment, Medical Malprac-
tice: A Move Toward Strict Liability, 21 Loy. L. REv. 194, 207-11 (1975); 1975 B.Y. L.
REV. 572, 575; Note, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 55 B.U.
L. REV. 647 (1975).
See note 1 supra. The increase in litigation has led to what has been termed a
"medical malpractice crisis" that has manifested itself through increased premium
rates and the unavailibility of insurance carriers for health care providers. Jones v.
State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 414 (1976). See Brown, Social
Resource Allocation Through Medical Malpractice, 6 WILLAm'rrE L. J. 235, 242-47
(1970).
' Teahan, Malpractice-A Review of 174 Claims, 35 CONN. MED. 81, 82 (1971). For
a further discussion of the reasons attributed to the increase in malpractice litigation
see Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some Suggested Improvements and a Possi-
ble Alternative, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 623 (1966).
, One example of legislative liberalization in the area of malpractice litigation is
statutorily allowing plaintiffs to present causes of action to the jury without using an
expert witness. The plaintiff is allowed to use books and treatises authored by recog-
nized experts. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 79 (c) (Supp. 1976). See Note,
Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence:" Statutory and Common Law Innovations, 45
MINN. L. REv. 1019 (1961). Although this legislative liberalization has helped malprac-
tice plaintiffs overcome the conspiracy of silence, see note 7 infra, it has been criticized
on the grounds that excerpts from books could be used out of context and a jury would
be better able to understand a live witness rather than a book filled with technical
terminology. Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse, and Prognosis of Medical Malpractice, 8
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 598, 610 n. 46 (1974). An additional criticism of the use of books is
that their authors are not available for cross-examination. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1690 at 2 (Chadborn rev. 1976).
Judicial liberalization has resulted from changes in the use of expert testimony.
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zation of the laws governing medical malpractice. In response to this
problem, physicians on their own have sought to decrease the possi-
bility of facing a malpractice suit. One method increasingly used is
the countersuit against the malpractice plaintiff and often his attor-
ney." Further, as a result of encouragement by the medical profes-
sion,9 many states have enacted legislation attempting to eliminate
frivolous malpractice actions and limit exorbitant damage awards."°
Among the alternatives that legislatures have enacted" are provisions
Traditionally, the medical profession has been embraced in a "conspiracy of silence,"
as evidenced by a reluctance of physicians to testify against their fellow practitioners.
See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968). As a result,
plaintiffs may find it difficult to obtain medical experts willing to testify. To amend
the situation, courts have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the'area of
medical malpractice. Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal.2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1962); Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Or. 196, 400 P.2d 234 (1965). See Comment, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases in Oregon, 6 WIuAmETTE L. J. 253 (1970).
Under this doctrine, a plaintiff can establish his case without using expert testimony
if he shows that an injury doesn't normally occur in the absence of negligence, that
the instrument causing the injury was under the defendant's control at all times, and
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 39 at
214 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Broder, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 421 (1969); Knisely, Modern Medico-Legal Trends, 25 OHIO
ST. L. J. 360, 365 (1964).
1 Cohn, The Malpractice Battle, The Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1977, at C1, col.
1. District of Columbia Medical Society officials have asked Washington doctors to
create a $100,000 fund to fight "frivolous and unfounded" malpractice actions. An
Independent Legal Resources fund is being proposed to finance suits against lawyers
and plaintiffs who file malpractice suits with no basis in fact. Id. See text accompany-
Ing notes 111-141 infra.
The medical profession has taken the attitude that it is socially desirable for
physicians to be allowed to work with the knowledge that if they practice within
accepted standards they will be free from malpractice exposure. The profession be-
lieves that the United States cannot afford a paranoid physician population. Charfoos,
HELLING: The Law of Medical Malpractice Rewritten, 2 OHIO N. L. REv. 692, 703
(1975).
10 For a state-by-state analysis of recent legislative activities concerning medical
malpractice see HEALTH POLICY CENTER, GEORGETOWN UNIVERsITY, A LEGISLATOR'S
GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATOR'S
GUIDE]; Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Mal-
practice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L. J. 1417.
11 Various methods that have been considered and enacted by state legislatures
to limit the increase in malpractice litigation include a hospital or physician-owned
insurance company (Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, North Dakota); a state-managed
insurance fund (eight states including Florida, Michigan, New York and Pennsyl-
vania); a Joint Underwriter's Association in which insurance companies would be
compelled to provide regulated coverage with provisions for the sharing of losses or
gains (twenty-four states including California, Georgia, Maryland, New York, North
Carolina and South Carolina) and provisions whereby a physician and a patient as a
19771
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for malpractice review panels which give opinions on the efficacy of
claims, 2 and statutes limiting the amount of damages recoverable in
a malpractice action.
3
In Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association," the Illinois
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute
limiting recovery in a medical malpractice action to $500,000.'1 The
plaintiff contended that, by denying recovery for damages in excess
of $500,000, the Illinois legislature had "arbitrarily classified, and
unreasonably discriminated against" those victims of medical mal-
practice who are most seriously injured. 8 The defendants argued that
such unequal treatment was necessary to contend with the
"malpractice crisis."'" To support their argument, the defendants
relied on the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act as precedent for
the constitutional limitation of damages recoverable for personal in-
juries. 8 The Workmen's Compensation Act provides a quid pro quo
whereby the employer assumes liability without fault, but is relieved
of the burden of large damage judgments. The employee, although
limited in the amount he could recover, is awarded compensation
without regard to the employer's negligence and is assured a quick,
condition precedent to treatment would sign an agreement providing for arbitration
of any medical malpractice issues that may subsequently arise. LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE,
supra note 10 at 4-11. See e.g., VA. CODE § 8-503 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,2 See text accompanying notes 46-110 infra.
,3 See text accompanying notes 14-45 infra. Among the states that have enacted
statutes limiting damages in medical malpractice actions are Virginia: VA. CODE § 8-
654.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976) ($750,000); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 § 101 (Supp. 1975)
($500,000); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976) ($500,000);
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (Supp. 1976) ($150,000 per person, $300,000 per occur-
ence).
" 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
'5 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70 § 101 (Supp. 1975). In Wright, the plaintiff brought an
action to recover damages from the hospital association and her treating physician for
personal injuri3s suffered while the plaintiff was at the hospital under her physician's
care. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of various
sections of the Illinois medical malpractice statutes. 347 N.E.2d at 737. The court not
only overturned the statute limiting damages, but also found unconstitutional a statu-
tory provision regulating the rates of medical malpractice insurance policies and other
statutory provisions relating to the establishment of medical malpractice review pan-
els. Id. at 734. See text accompanying notes 75-85 infra.
11 347 N.E.2d at 741. The plaintiff claimed that the legislature's effort to reduce
or maintain malpractice insurance premiums by limiting damages placed the burden
of those limitations solely on those unfortunate victims of serious malpractice who need
the most financial protection. Id.
11 Id. at 741, citing Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill.2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961);
Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
"1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1 et. seq. (Supp. 1975).
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effortless recovery.'9 Similarly, the defendants contended, there ex-
ists a societal quid pro quo whereby the loss of potential recovery to
a few medical malpractice victims is compensated for by lower insur-
ance premiums and lower medical care costs for the public."0 The
Illinois court rejected the defendants' quid pro quo argument and
held that the rationale did not extend to the seriously injured medical
patient.' The court further ruled that, to the extent "recovery is
permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis," there had been a special
privilege granted in violation of the Illinois Constitution.2 2 On the
basis of the court's finding of arbitrariness, the statute limiting dam-
ages to $500,000 was held to be violative of the Illinois Constitution.?
The Illinois court's finding that the state legislature could not
constitutionally limit the amount of damages because such legisla-
tion would constitute a special law24 is a proper adjudication of the
damage limitation issue.? By effectively precluding those patients
who have suffered serious injury from recovering amounts in excess
of $500,000, the Illinois statute wrongfully altered a common law right
of recovery without a concomitant quid pro quo.
2
The constitutionality of a damage-limiting statute was also con-
sidered by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. State Board of
" See Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill.2d 407, 412, 137 N.E.2d 842,845
(1956).
" 347 N.E.2d at 742.
21 Id. The court reasoned that although the Workmen's Compensation Act re-
quires the employee to give up certain recoverable damages, it does provide for the
payment of medical expenses and compensation for the duration of the employee's
incapacity. Conversely, the statute limiting damages in a medical malpractice action
abolished no common law defenses and did not alter the essential elements for a cause
of action for medical malpractice. In addition, a seriously injured malpractice victim
might not be able to recover even all the medical expenses he may have incurred. Id.
2 Id. at 743. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 13, entitled "Special Legislation," states that
"[tlhe General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or
can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be
a matter for judicial determination." See Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.2d 478, 283 N.E.2d
474, 478 (1972); Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill.2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317, 321 (1972).
2 347 N.E.2d at 743.
21 See note 22 supra.
2 Statutes limiting damages may constitute reform that may be instituted "one
step at a time" and therefore, do not fall within the classification of unreasonableness
and arbitrariness. 347 N.E.2d at 743. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Nevertheless, Illinois courts have consistently held that when
recovery is denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege has been granted in viola-
tion of the Illinois Constitution. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474, 479
(1972); Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1964).
" The right to recover damages for injuries suffered from medical malpractice
existed at common law. E.g., Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 329 (1860). See notes 1 & 21 supra.
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Medicine.27 In Jones, the appellant State Board of Medicine chal-
lenged a lower court ruling that an Idaho statute limiting damages
in a medical malpractice action was unconstitutional.2 Respondents
argued that by limiting recovery in malpractice actions, the Idaho
statute created a classification which is discriminatory and violative
of the equal protection clauses of both the Federal" and the Idaho
Constitutions.3 0 This argument was based on the statute's differentia-
tion between those who are injured in amounts exceeding the statu-
tory limit and those damaged in amounts less than the statutory
limit. Respondents also urged that in view of the Illinois court's hold-
ing in Wright,3 1 the Idaho statute should be found to be violative of
the prohibition against special legislation in the Idaho Constitution."
Examining the purpose of the damage-limiting statute, the court
concluded that if the statute was enacted in response to the growing
malpractice problem, and if it served the health and welfare of the
people of Idaho, then it would survive the equal protection and spe-
cial legislation challenges. 3 The court found that the appellants had
not introduced enough evidence to support a finding on the purpose
of the statute. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court
for additional evidence.34
The Jones court failed to recognize that the real victims of the
medical malpractice crisis are those patients who are seriously in-
jured through a physician's negligence and who are precluded from
recovering more than $150,000 in damages. The Idaho court appeared
97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act, codified at IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (Supp.
1976). The Act was enacted in response to the "alleged 'medical malpractice insurance
crisis'." 555 P.2d at 402. Included within the Act are provisions that limit the recover-
able damages for actions against physicians at $150,000 per claim and $300,000 per
occurrence. Id.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
"0 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2 provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit. . ....
"' See text accompanying notes 14-26 supra.
12 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19 provides in part:
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the follow-
ing enumerated cases, that is to say: . . . Releasing or extinguishing,
in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any
person or corporation in this state, or any other municipal corporation
therein. . ..
555 P.2d at 411,417.
Although the Idaho court did not specifically state who was to gather the addi-
tional evidence, apparently this burden would be on the appellants. See id. at 417.
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to refute its own conclusions by noting that, nationally, fewer than
one percent of all malpractice recoveries in 1970 were in excess of
$100,000, and that in 1974 the average settlement for a claim was
$12,535.35 The Jones court added that in 1970, medical malpractice
insurance losses in Idaho constituted less than one-tenth of one per-
cent of the national total.3 1 Statistically, the Idaho malpractice claim
in excess of $100,000 is a rarity, and yet the Jones court believed that
by limiting damages to $150,000 the medical malpractice problem
could be alleviated.Y
Virginia's damage-limiting statute for medical malpractice cases
has yet to be judicially examined. By allowing damage recoveries up
to $750,000,1 the Virginia statute appears to be more quantitatively
reasonable than the Idaho statute.3 9 Nevertheless, the Virginia enact-
ment faces the same constitutional challenge of "special privilege"
that invalidated the Illinois statute in Wright.l The Virginia Consti-
tution prohibits the enactment of special legislation that changes the
methods of enforcing judgments.' Therefore, the Virginia statute
may constitute special legislation by limiting the common law right
of recovery for medical malpractice to $750,000. As in Idaho,42 claims




VA. CODE § 8-654.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976) states:
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for
malpractice where the act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after
[April 1, 1977] which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered
against a health care provider in such an action which is tried without
a jury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a
patient shall not exceed [$750,000].
3, See note 28 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 14-26 supra.
' Although the Virginia Constitution is not identical to the Illinois Constitution
regarding the prohibition of special legislation, see note 22 supra, the Virginia Consti-
tution does state that "[t]he General Assembly shall not enact any local, special, or
private law in the following cases: ... 3) Regulating the practice in... or providing
or changing the methods of. . . enforcing judgments. . . ." VA. CONST. art. 4, § 14.
See Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions
it Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 51, 67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Harlan].
2 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
11 From 1970 to 1975 no claim for medical malpractice in Virginia was reported in
excess of $500,000, and only one claim was settled for $250,000. S.C.C., supra note 1,
at 28. The average malpractice verdict against Virginia physicians in 1975 was $10,000.
Id. at 19. In 1976, however, a verdict of $725,000 was returned against a number of
health care providers jointly. Baley v. Luthey, Civ. No. 12229 (Hampton, Va. Cir. Ct.,
May 24, 1976).
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fact would seem to preclude the necessity of a statute limiting dam-
ages since malpractice suits in excess of $750,000 pose no real threat
in Virginia. Nevertheless, placing limitations on damages prevents
those few people whose injuries represent more than $750,000 from
fully recovering.
Allowing victims of medical malpractice to recover damages for
their injuries is one way that society can ease their pain and suffer-
ing.4 To restrict these victims to an arbitrary sum is to compound
the damage done by a negligent physician.45 By limiting such dam-
ages through the enactment of statutes, state legislatures have failed
in this attempt to alleviate a "malpractice crisis."
In addition to statutes limiting damages in a medical malpractice
action, state legislatures have also instituted provisions for medical
malpractice review panels.4" While damage-limiting statutes evi-
dence an attempt by state legislatures to deal with the medical mal-
practice problem at the end of the litigation continuum, medical
malpractice review panels attempt to confront the problem at the
start of the litigation process. Malpractice review panels have had
their genesis in a general dissatisfaction with the traditional proce-
dure of medical malpractice cases.4" Among the major difficulties
with the traditional procedure of medical malpractice cases for plain-
tiffs are long delays between the filing of the suit and final disposi-
tion, resulting in unreasonable delays for compensation of valid
claims; problems in obtaining medical experts to assist in case prepa-
ration and testifying; and high costs for case preparation, including
experts' fees.' From the defendant physician's viewpoint, traditional
litigation procedures present opportunities for patients to file unjusti-
fied or nuisance suits which can damage a physician's reputation and
practice."9 In addition, the complex nature of many malpractice cases
" Fuchsberg, Myths of Medical Malpractice, 11 TRIAL LAW Q. 49, 55
(Spring/Summer 1976) [hereinafter cited as Fuchsberg].
,1 Id. One example of the inadequacy of damage-limiting statutes is the hypotheti-
cal situation of a young, talented doctor or lawyer who is permanently injured through
the negligence of a physician. A statute like Idaho's limiting damages against the
negligent physician to $150,000 would obviously not begin to cover the loss of future
earnings for a young professional.
" See note 51 infra.
'" See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
" Note, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 695, 709-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Screening Panels].
,1 Screening Panels, supra note 48, at-709. One result of using traditional litigation
procedures is the practice of "defensive medicine" by physicians to lessen the chances
for a malpractice suit. Such "defensive medicine," consisting of copious diagnostic
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has created problems for the trier of fact in making competant deter-
minations of whether a physician is liable for professional negli-
gence. 0 Attempting to alleviate some of the difficulties with the tra-
ditional procedure of malpractice cases, many states have established
medical malpractice review panels to prevent unjustified or nuisance
suits and to help dispose of claims that appear valid." The medical
profession fears malpractice suits, even if ill-founded, because of their
possible adverse effects upon an individual's reputation.2 Aware of
this fear, legislatures have instituted review panels for the purpose of
curtailing frivolous actions. 3 The panels also recognize the difficulty
plaintiffs have in obtaining expert witnesses to testify in legitimate
suits, and therefore arrange for expert witnesses to testify on behalf
of the plaintiff.
Virginia's provisions for medical malpractice review panels exem-
plify how state legislatures have attempted to solve some of the prob-
tests and a reluctance to try innovative procedures, represents a major part of the crisis
over the cost of health care. Id. at 709-10. Although the most immediate cost affects
the patient in the form of higher medical bills, of more consequence is the "opportunity
cost" or "alternate use cost" resulting from a misallocation of medical resources. The
overall effect is a reduction in the quantity of care available for legitimate health needs
at a time when the demand and need for medical care exceeds the supply. Project, The
Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L. J. 9.39, 943.
Screening Panels, supra note 48, at 710. See e.g., Anderson v. Florence, 288
Minn. 351, 181 N.W.2d 873 (1970); Hoffman v. Naslund, 274 Minn. 521, 144 N.W.2d
580 (1966).
51 Among the more than thirteen states that have established malpractice review
panels are: Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and
Virginia. In 1962, through the joint efforts of the Virginia State Bar and Medical
Society of Virginia, a "Joint Screening Panel" was established for the discretionary use
of malpractice claimants. The purpose of the Joint Screening Panel was to prevent
frivolous claims from being filed against physicians, and to assist in the preparation
of reasonable claims through the use of medical experts. Harlan, supra note 41, at 51.
Because it required the plaintiffs attorney to withdraw from the case in the face of an
adverse ruling, the "Joint Screening Panel" was rarely used. Id. After considering a
number of alternatives to dealing with the growing malpractice problem, see note 11
supra, the Virginia General Assembly in 1976 created provisions for medical malprac-
tice review panels. VA. CODE §§ 8-911 to 922 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Unlike the previous
provisions for a Joint Screening Panel, the 1976 statute does not require the withdrawal
from the case of the plaintiff's attorney in the face of an adverse ruling.
52 Screening Panels, supra note 48, at 702. See Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits
as Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 51,53 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Adler].
Screening Panels, supra note 48, at 705. Typically the panel considers whether
there is substantial evidence of malpractice and whether there is a reasonable medical
probability that the claimant was injured by the negligent act. Id. at 706.
11 Id. at 705.
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lems of medical malpractice litigation." The Virginia statute requires
the panel to include three impartial attorneys and three impartial
health care providers," all of whom are licensed and actively practic-
ing their professions in the congressional district where suit would be
brought.17 A Virginia circuit court judge serves as chairman of the
panel, and he can vote only in case of a tie.58 An obvious deficiency
in the panel structure is the requirement that the panel members be
from the same congressional district as the defendant doctor. Al-
though this requirement apparently relates to the "community stan-
dard of care" doctrine," the practical effect of this requirement would
be to hamper the panel's impartiality by limiting members to profes-
sionals in close geographical proximity to the defendant."
Before an action is commenced under the Virginia system, the
patient must give the health care provider written notification of the
acts of alleged malpractice and the date on which the alleged events
occurred.6 ' From the time of this notice, either the potential plaintiff
or the health care provider may file a request within 60 days with the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia for the case to be
reviewed by a Medical Malpractice Review Panel." The statute fur-
ther provides that a malpractice action cannot be brought within 90
days of the claimant's notification to the health care provider, and if
a review panel is requested, within its period of review. After notice
of a claim has been given to the health care provider, the statute of
limitations is tolled" for 120 days or 60 days after the issuance of the
VA. CODE §§ 8-911 to 922 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
The term "health care provider" includes doctors, dentists, nurses, hospitals,
nursing homes and other licensed individuals, facilities or institutions. VA. CODE § 8-
911(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
57 VA. CODE § 8-913 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'Id.
5' Part of a plaintiff's burden of proof in a medical malpractice action is the
showing of a violation of the physician's "community standard of care". See text
accompanying note 3 supra. The community standard of care is utilized in malpractice
actions in Virginia. E.g. Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 225, S.E.2d 387 (1976).
" Harlan, supra note 41, at 54.
" VA. CODE § 8-912 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
62 Id.
'Id.
" VA. CODE § 8-24 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that every action for personal
injury must be brought within two years after the accrual of the right to bring the
action. The statute of limitations begins to run from the moment the cause of action
accrues and not when it is subsequently discovered by the injured patient. Hawks v.
DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) (cause of action began when pin left in
plaintiff's neck, not 17 years later when discovered). See Morgan v. Schlanger, 374 F.2d
235, 239 (4th Cir. 1967); Cf. Burton v. Terrell, 368 F. Supp. 553, 557 (W.D. Va. 1973)
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
review panel's opinion, whichever is later."
Once the medical review panel has received all evidence pertinent
to the action, it is required to render one or more of the following
opinions: that the plaintiff's claim has no merit; that the health care
provider failed in meeting his standard of care, which was the proxi-
mate cause of the alleged injury; that although the health care provi-
der failed in meeting his standard of care, the failure was not the
proximate cause of the alleged injury; or that there is an outstanding
issue of fact concerning liability which is the proper subject for a
court's or jury's consideration in a trial.6
The opinion of the medical malpractice review panel is significant
in that it may be admitted into evidence in any malpractice action
subsequently brought by the claimant.67 Although the opinion is not
conclusive and either party has the right to call any member of the
panel as a witness, the use of this extra-judicial board's opinion will
certainly affect the character of a malpractice action through its in-
fluence over the jury and alterations of the rules of evidence."s The
Virginia Constitution places great importance upon the right to a
civil trial by jury." By allowing the panel's opinion to be admitted
(fraudulant sale of land). But see Comment, Discovery Rule: Accrual of Cause of
Action for Medical Malpractice, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 78 (1968). Contrarily, the
"discovery" rule provides for the accrual of a cause of action for medical malj'ractice
when the patient learns, or should have learned, of the presence of a foreign object in
his body. E.g. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
" VA. CODE § 8-919 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" Id. at § 8-917 (A). The statute also provides that the review panel's findings may
include a determination of whether the claimant suffered any disability or impairment
and the extent of those injuries. Id. at § 8-917(B).
" Id. at § 8-918.
" Harlan, supra note 41, at 61-63. Alterations in the rules of evidence through the
use of malpractice review panels may occur in at least two ways. First, evidence to be
submitted to the panel is required to be in written form only. Upon this evidence the
panel can make its decision without a hearing or without allowing adverse parties the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. VA. CODE § 8-914 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This
decision could then be introduced at the subsequent trial, void of evidential safeguards
that may have changed its substance. Second, the panel may choose to hold a hearing
in which the rules of evidence would not be applicable. Id. at § 8-916(ii). If the panel's
opinion were based on evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible at trial, the issue
arises whether this would preclude the use of the panel's opinion in the subsequent
trial. Harlan, supra note 41, at 63. The statute does not address this issue and appar-
ently the opinion of the panel could be used at trial anyway. Id. The problem with
allowing the panel to consider evidence that would be inadmissible at trial is that a
party adverse to the panel's opinion could argue that the opinion itself is inadmissible
evidence. Id.
o VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 11 provides in part "[t]hat in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other,
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into evidence, the legislature has allowed the jury to be subject to
undue influence,70 resulting from the esteem the expert members of
the panel would command from the jurors.7
Disregarding the degree of undue influence as violative of the
Virginia Constitution, the statute may additionally be subject to a
constitutional attack upon the powers of the panel. The Constitution
of Virginia provides that the judicial power shall be vested in the
Supreme Court and any other subordinate courts that the legislature
may establish. 2 The Virginia Constitution also places limitations
upon the legislature with regard to judicial functions by prohibiting
the enactment of any law that regulates judicial proceedings." By
giving to members of the panel judicial powers of hearing evidence
and deciding questions of law and fact, the Virginia legislature may
have violated the state constitution by assigning a judicial function
to a non-judicial panel.71
The Illinois Supreme Court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospi-
tal Association 5 declared a statute providing for medical malpractice
review panels 6 unconstitutional.77 The court held that nonjudicial
members of the panel, by being allowed to make conclusions of law
and fact, were improperly empowered with judicial functions 8 in vio-
lation of the Illinois Constitution. 79 Further, the court determined
and ought to be held sacred."
70 The possibility of undue influence in a medical malpractice action is great. The
complexity of the subject matter combined with the expertise and official nature of
the members of the panel could very likely lead a jury to plaice too much emphasis on
the panel's opinion. See Harlan, supra note 41, at 62.
71 Id.
72 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
" VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14 provides that "[tihe General Assembly shall not enact
any local, special, or private law in the following cases: ... 3) Regulating the practice
in, or the jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceedings
or inquiry before the courts or other tribunals .. "
" See note 68 supra. Review panels differ from other non-judicial bodies such as
the State Corporation Commission, which received its judicial power through the state
constitution, VA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 & 2, and which is required to observe the
common law and statutory rules of evidence when it is called upon to render judg-
ments. VA. CODE § 12.1-30 (1973).
7 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). See text accompanying notes 14-25 supra.
7 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 58.2 to 58.10 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
347 N.E.2d at 741.
70 347 N.E.2d at 739-40.
T, ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 states that "[tlhe judicial power is vested in a Supreme
Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 provides in
part that "Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters
except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. .. ."
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that the right to a jury trial in a civil case was impermissibly re-
stricted by the procedure prescribed for medical review panels. 80
Differences exist between the Illinois and Virginia review panel
statutes which might save the Virginia statute from the constitu-
tional attack that invalidated the Illinois statute. The Illinois statute
required all medical malpractice cases to be heard by a review
panel," while the Virginia statute provides for the convening of a
review panel at the discretion of either party. 2 The coercive nature
of the Illinois statute was one of the factors that led to a finding of
its unconstitutionality,13 but this would not be a factor in a considera-
tion of the Virginia statute. In addition, the Illinois statute allowed
parties to agree to be bound by the determination of the panel and
judgment could be rendered thereon.84 The Virginia statute, on the
other hand, allows only for the admissibility of the panel's opinion
at the subsequent trial and does not provide for parties to be bound
by the panel's opinion. 5
A lower New York state court recently upheld the constitution-
ality of a review panel statute similar to Virginia's in Comiskey v.
Arlen.8" The challenged New York statute provides for the admissibil-
ity at trial of the unanimous recommendation of the panel concerning
liability. 7 The statute provides, however, that the panel's recommen-
dations are not binding on the trier of fact, but shall be given such
weight as the jury or trial court decides to ascribe to it.8" If the panel's
recommendations are read to the jury or by the trial court, certain
members of the panel may be called as witnesses by either party, but
only in reference to the panel's recommendation. 9
" 347 N.E.2d at 741. ILL. CONST. art I, § 13 states that "[t]he right of trial by
jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." This constitutional provision is
similar to the jury trial provisions of the Virginia Constitution. See note 69 supra.
"! ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 58.3 (1975) required the circuit court to order the
convening of "a medical review panel to which the case shall be assigned for hearing
and determination." This panel will convene "[n]o sooner than 120 days nor later
than one year after the parties are at issue on the pleadings."
'
"2 VA. CODE § 8-912 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" The Wright court found that review panels were an impermissible restriction
on the right to a trial by jury. 347 N.E.2d at 741.
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 58.8 (1975).
VA. CODE § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1975).
'Id.
s ' Id. Some procedural questions concerning the interpretation of the statute arise,
such as whether the party adversely affected by the panel's recommendations has the
right to call panel members as witnesses; see Harlan, supra note 41 at 63, or whether
1977]
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In Comiskey, the review panel had considered all the submitted
evidence and concluded unanimously that no malpractice had oc-
curred." The plaintiff moved to suppress the panel's recommenda-
tion and requested a special trial on this issue. The trial court held
that the statute allowing the admissibility of the panel's conclusions
as evidence9' was unconstitutional. Reversing the trial court, the
Appellate Division held that the lower court had prematurely consid-
ered the constitutionality of the statute." Stating that constitutional
questions should not be considered until their disposition became
necessary, 3 the Appellate Division found that constitutional objec-
tions would be better handled during the malpractice trial at a time
when the panel's recommendation would be offered as evidence. 4 The
trial court in Comiskey had also concluded that a jury would not be
able to weigh objectively the merits of the panel's recommendation,
thus depriving the plaintiff of the right to a fair trial.9 Conversely,
the Appellate Division noted that, historically, jurors have proven
their independence from matters of undue influence. The panel's
recommendation was compared to the testimony of an expert witness,
which may be evaluated by the jury in accordance with the judge's
instructions. 7 The Appellate Division distinguished its findings from
those of the court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association8
these witnesses then will be considered hostile witnesses and therefore be subject to
full cross-examination. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 19 at 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
go 55 App. Div. 2d at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
g, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
12 55 App. Div. 2d at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
I3 d.
In Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the
constitutionality of the review panel statute, N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1976), was determined by the trial court after the panel's recommendations were
offered as evidence at the trial.
'5 Comiskey v. Arlen, 45 U.S.L.W. 2019, 2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 2, 1976).
55 App. Div. 2d at 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 125, citing Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc.
2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976). But see text accompanying notes 70 & 71
supra.
97 To justify its comparison of the panel's findings to an expert opinion the
Comiskey court cited Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), in which the Supreme
Court held that a federal district court could refer questions of fact to a court appointed
non-judicial officer, whose report could be introduced at trail as prima facie evidence
of the facts found and the conclusions reached. The Court rationalized its holding by
stating that "[tlhe command of the Seventh Amendment that 'the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved' does not require that old forms of practice and procedure be
retained." Id. at 309.
" 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
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because of differences between the New York 9 and Illinois'10 statutes.
The Comiskey court observed that under the Illinois statute, the
panel's recommendation could not be subjected to the jury's scru-
tiny, '0 while under the New York statute, the jury is free to determine
the weight it will give the panel's recommendations. The Comiskey
court's analysis seems to ignore the possibility-that the panel's recom-
mendation might unduly influence the jury.0
Since the Virginia review panel statute more closely resembles the
New York statute than the Illinois statute,' 3 the Virginia statute will
probably be subject to judicial scrutiny similar to that made by the
Comiskey court. The crucial issue that the Supreme Court of Virginia
must decide in examining the constitutionality of review panels is
whether admission of the panel's recommendation into evidence is an
infringement of the qualified right to a jury trial in a civil case.' 4 If
the Virginia court follows the rationale of the Comiskey court, Vir-
ginia's review panel statute will probably be upheld.
Although malpractice review panels may be adjudged constitu-
tional, they are beset with many practical problems that restrict their
effectiveness. Malpractice review panels depend upon two variables
for successful operation. First, there must be cooperation between the
medical and bar associations.'05 Second, insurance carriers are needed
to support the use of review panels by cooperating with the submis-
sion of cases to the panels. 00 This cooperation has often been lacking
" See note 87 and text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
"0 See note 75 and text accompanying notes 75-85 supra.
202 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8 (1975). The opinion of the review panel could
not be subject to the jury's scrutiny because both parties could agree to be bound by
the opinion and judgment would be entered thereon. If both parties did not agree to
be bound, the panel's opinion could not have been admitted into evidence at trial. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
" As in the New York law, the Virginia statute allows for the admission of the
panel's recommendation into evidence. Both statutes also provide that the recommen-
dations shall not be binding on the jury. Compare N.Y. JuD. LAW § 1480 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976) with VA. CODE § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"I, See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
I' Screening Panels, supra note 48, at 721. Review panels that have successfully
reduced the number of malpractice suits brought before courts have attributed their
success to close cooperation between members of the bar and the medical profession.
See id. at 713-17. This has resulted in noticeable attempts by members of both profes-
sions to encourage claimants to submit their actions to the panels. Unfortunately, this
inter-professional cooperation has not taken place in urban areas as frequently as in
rural areas. Probably the major factor that can be attributed to this lack of cooperation
in urban areas is the sheer size and impersonal nature of a highly populated area. Id.
at 715.
"I Many insurance companies disfavor review panels. They feel that the proce-
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because the use of review panels is voluntary and the decisions made
are not binding."7 Without the support of their insurance carriers,
physicians have little incentive to sustain the system of review pan-
els.'10 Additionally, the review panels meet only for brief periods of
time, and thus may be unable to review all relevant evidence., 9 Fur-
ther, they do not hear the testimony of a variety of witnesses and so
cannot resolve issues of credibility."' Because of the various constitu-
tional and practical problems associated with medical malpractice
review panels, they presently are not a reasonably workable solution
to the medical malpractice crisis. Until the problems with review
panels are resolved through a closer cooperation and understanding
between the legal and medical professions, the best arbiter of mal-
practice claims remains the jury.
Many members of the medical profession believe that legislation
has not adequately curtailed the increase of malpractice actions and
have therefore begun to utilize the countersuit as a solution to the
malpractice crisis. Numerous malpractice actions are brought
against physicians without justifiable cause."' As a result, many doc-
tors feel that they are entitled to some kind of protection from the
harassment of invalid suits."' The weapon which some doctors be-
lieve may prove most effective is the countersuit based on the theory
of malicious prosecution."' Malicious prosecution represents an im-
dure is weighted in favor of the malpractice claimant and that there is pressure to settle
because the claimant is guaranteed expert testimony. Insurance carriers also argue
that if the claimant fails before the panel, the knowledge he has gained through the
panel's hearing may negate the adverse effect of an unfavorable panel vote. Id. at 716,
citing THE MEDICAL PROTECTIVE Co., PRE-TRIAL MALPRACTICE SCREENING PANELS: A
COMMENTARY (1970). See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. JUD. LAw §
148-a (8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
101 See note 106 supra.
' Screening Panels, supra note 48, at 715.
109 Fuchsberg, supra note 45, at 57.
I" Id.
Compulsory arbitration in Pima County, Arizona, has revealed that 57 of 65
cases arbitrated over a 12-year period were found to be meritless. Brooke, supra note
1, at 229. Lawyers reportedly reject nine out of ten prospective malpractice cases, and
30% of the cases brought to court have no merit. Time, Nov. 2, 1970 at 36.
1,2 Brooke, supra note 1, at 226.
"M See Note, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, 26 TENN. L. REV. 437
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Essential Elements]. Historically, malicious prosecution
actions have been disfavored as countersuits to civil proceedings. Fearful that threats
of counterclaims for malicious prosecution would adversely affect a person's right to
bring a cause of action, courts have been reluctant to expand the availability of the
remedy. In Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the court argued
against malicious prosecution actions by stating that, a margin of safety in asserting
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balance between the conflicting interests of parties to the original
civil suit. Plaintiffs are immune from causes of action arising out of
their good faith efforts to secure legal or equitable adjudication of
their rights."' Correspondingly, defendants have the right to be free
from unreasonable litigation."' The physician's burden of proof in an
action for malicious prosecution requires his proving that a malprac-
tice suit was brought against him without probable cause, that there
was a malicious motive in bringing the original suit, that the mal-
practice suit was terminated in his favor, and finally, that the suit
resulted in damage."'
For a physician to establish that the plaintiff brought a malprac-
tice action without probable cause, he must prove that the plaintiff
lacked an honest and reasonable belief that a tenable claim existed., 7
To determine the existence of probable cause, the jury must examine
the facts and circumstances surrounding the initial malpractice ac-
tion. The question is not whether the defendant physician in the
initial action was actually liable, but whether there were reasonable
grounds for the plaintiff to believe him liable."'
Requiring a malicious prosecution action to await termination of
the initial suit in favor of the defendant effectively forecloses initia-
tion of countersuits during the pendency of the initial action."9 The
rights, though they may be groundless and their assertion accompanied by some degree
of ill-will, must be maintained. Otherwise litigation would lead not to an end of dis-
putes, but to a beginning, and rights violated would go unredressed from fear of the
danger of asserting them.
"I Adler, supra note 52, at 54.
Is Id. See Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical
Malpractice Claims? 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653, 656 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Malicious Prosecution]. An individual's right to bring a cause of action must be
protected in view of the interest of the citizen to be free from vexatious actions, damage
and possible ruin, and the interests of the courts in promoting the honest use of the
judicial process. Id. at 661.
"' Id. at 657. See generally Kauffman v. A.H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448
S.W.2d 400 (1969); Community Natl. Bank v. Burt, 183 So.2d 731 (Fla. App. 1966).
"I A plaintiff has probable cause to bring an action when he reasonably believes
in the existence of facts under which his claim may be valid. E.g., Title Guar. Co. v.
Harmer, 482 P.2d 430, 432 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Kunz v. Johnson, 74 S.D. 577, 57
N.W.2d 116, 119 (1953).
"' Essential Elements, supra note 114, at 439. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co.,
358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App.2d 810, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 799 (1967).
"I An action for malicious prosecution cannot be asserted through a cross-
complaint or counterclaim in the original proceeding, prior to its termination, since
the original proceeding must have been previously terminated in favor of the party
bringing the malicious prosecution action. Bollinger v. Jarret, 146 Mont. 355, 406 P.2d
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termination rule prevents inconsistent judgments where a plaintiff
might prevail in his original action, yet fail on the countersuit for
malicious prosecution.12 The rule also prevents prejudice to the origi-
nal action when evidence is introduced in the countersuit concerning
malice and lack of probable cause.'
2 1
In addition to the requirement of a favorable termination, a show-
ing of malice is essential to a malicious prosecution countersuit.
1
2
Malice can include evidence of ill will, anger, or absence of a bona
fide belief of fault.'2 Actual proof of malice may be inferred from the
circumstances indicating a lack of probable cause.2 4 It is difficult for
a physician to prove malice because he is required to show that the
plaintiff knew he had no case when he brought the malpractice action
or persisted in his actions after learning that the physician had done
nothing wrong. To overcome a physician's countersuit allegations, all
a malpractice plaintiff need show is that he had a reasonable basis
for bringing his suit. If malice cannot be proven, the countersuit will
fail.' 
2
Countersuits by physicians stemming from alleged frivolous mal-
834, 837 (1965). See Luckett v. Cohen, 169 F. Supp. 808, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Embassy
Sewing Stores, Inc. v. Leumi Financial Corp., 39 App, Div.2d 940, 333 N.Y.S.2d 106,
108 (1972). Even if a doctor prevails in a malpractice suit, he does not necessarily
prevail in a countersuit. "To justify such a suit you have to show that a reasonable
investigation, had one been made, would have disclosed no grounds for complaint in
the first place." Reynolds, How Plaintiff's Attorneys View the Countersuit Tactic, 53
MED. ECON. 73, 75 (Oct. 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds].
"' Babb v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal.3d 841, 846-47, 479 P.2d 379, 383-84, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179, 182-83 (1971); McMahon v. May Dept. Stores Co., 374 S.W.2d 82, 90-91 (Sup.
Ct. Mo. 1964).
121 479 P.2d at 383-84.
2 Malicious Prosecution, supra note 114, at 669. Crescent City Livestock Co. v.
Butcher's Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 U.S. 141 (1887); Meints v. Huntington, 276
F. 245 (8th Cir: 1921).
'2 Wilson v. Dunaway, 112 Ga. 241, 144 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1965). See Malicious
Prosecution, supra note 114, at 669.
,' Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, 15 S.E.2d 353, 359 (1941);
Tanner-Brice Co. v. Barrs, 55 Ga. App. 453, 190 S.E. 676 (1937). In Hunter v. Beckley
Newspapers Corp., 129 W.Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d 332, 337 (1946), before an inference of
malice could be made, the party bringing the action for malicious prosecution was
required to show a lack of probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence.
Any unlawful act done "willfully and purposely to the injury of another" may be
proof of malice. Note, Malicious Prosecution-The Law in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REv.
340, 353 (1968). See Smith, Medical Malpractice: The Countersuit Fad, 12 TmAL 44,
46 (Dec., 1976); Carroll v. Kalar, 545 P.2d 411, 412 (Ariz. 1976); Strong v. Roberts &
Goldberg, No. 74-2476 (Ct. C.P., Lucas Cty. Ohio, March, 1976).
02 Reynolds, supra note 119, at 75. See Konas v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 158 Colo.
29, 404 P.2d 546 (1965); Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So.2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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practice actions have been few. Until recently, no doctor had been
successful in a countersuit to a medical malpractice claim."' How-
ever, in Berlin v. Nathan'2- a radiologist brought a successful counter-
suit against a patient and her attorneys alleging that he was owed a
duty not to be involved in malpractice litigation without reasonable
cause and that this duty had been violated.-8 The day after the jury
for the malpractice action had been selected the plaintiff withdrew
her complaint.- 9 Subsequently, Mrs. Nathan and her attorneys were
found liable for "willfully and wantonly bringing suit against the
plaintiff Dr. Berlin, and involving him in litigation without reason-
able cause.""' Mrs. Nathan's attorneys were also found liable for
"falling below standards of care required of attorneys to perform their
professional duties in good faith and in a legal manner."''
3
The importance of the Berlin decision lies not only in the fact that
it is the first case in which a doctor succeeded in a countersuit to a
malpractice complain't, but also in that it allowed recovery against
the patient's attorneys. Generally, an attorney is immune from liabil-
ity to third persons as long as he does not depart from his role as a
quasi-judicial officer who is charged with the responsibility for the
121 Berlin, The Most Important Countersuit Victory Yet, 53 MED. ECON. 199, 200
(Sept. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Countersuit Victory].
I" Civ. No. 75-M2-542 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., June 1, 1976). In Foster v. McClain,
251 So.2d 179 (La. App. 1971), the-physician's countersuit, based on libel, charged that
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint were malicious and defamatory. A trial court
decision was reversed on the grounds that the physician failed to prove that the plain-
tiff's complaint had been prepared with malice. Id. at 182.
"I The plaintiff had injured her hand while playing tennis and had come to the
hospital for X-rays and treatment. Dissatisfied with the way her hand healed, Mrs.
Nathan commenced a $250,000 malpractice suit against the treating doctor, the hospi-
tal and the radiologist, Dr. Berlin. Before filing her complaint, Mrs. Nathan had been
referred to a well-known hand surgeon who, after examining Mrs. Nathan's hand,
opined that the treatment had been correct and that the condition of the hand was
not related to the treatment. Mrs. Nathan still proceeded to file her complaint.
Countersuit Victory, supra note 126, at 200-01..
I" Relating the events leading up to the trial, Dr. Berlin stated that Mrs. Nathan
and her attorneys must have been nervous about the countersuit. They offered to
withdraw their malpractice suit, if he withdrew his countersuit. Berlin refused. Then
Mrs. Nathan and her attorneys proposed to admit to making a false statement in a
legal complaint provided that Dr. Berlin waive a demand for payment of a fine. Dr.
Berlin again refused. Finally Mrs. Nathan voluntarily withdrew her malpractice com-
plaint. Id. at 206.
I Id. at 211-12, citing Berlin v. Nathan, Civ. No. 75-M2-542 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
Cty., June 1, 1976).
,"' Id. In accordance with the trial court's holding, Dr. Berlin was awarded $6,000
in punitive damages and $2,000 in compensatory damages.
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administration of justice. 32 In ethically performing his duties to a
client and to the courts, an attorney is required to have a reasonable
and honest belief that his client's claim is a valid one for which
probable cause exists to initiate suit.3 3 The American Bar Associa-
tion's Code of Professional Responsibility provides a set of ethical
guidelines for an attorney to follow in his practice.'34 Disciplinary
Rule 7-102 proscribes an attorney from filing a suit that is malicious
or harassing in character. 35 As long as an attorney abides by the
disciplinary rules set forth in the Code, he is immune from liability
to third persons in such actions as countersuits to medical malprac-
tice claims. 3 ' However, if an attorney institutes a proceeding without
probable cause or with malice, he loses that immunity and becomes
subject to both disciplinary and legal action.
37
Countersuits by physicians as yet present no real threat to poten-
tial malpractice plaintiffs or their attorneys. The requirements of a
showing of malice and a lack of probable cause to bring suit are
practically insurmountable burdens.18 The judiciary's general disfa-
vor of countersuits, 13 9 coupled with these practical difficulties,'
112 Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 241, 28 N.W.2d 780, 791 (1947). See
Campbell v. Yellow Cab. Co., 137 F.2d 918 (3rd Cir. 1943); Rosvall v. Provost, 155
N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. 1968).
'1 Tool Research & Eng.'s Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App.3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
"I The effectiveness of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY lies in its
strict enforcement by the legal profession. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT: PROBLEMS & RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT (1970).
' DR 7-102 (A)(1) of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY states:
[a] lawyer shall not: file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure another.
' Malicious Prosecution, supra note 115, at 671.
"7 Id. at 671-72.
lu See text accompanying note 125 supra.
" See note 113 supra.
'0 In addition to the difficulties a physician has in meeting his burden of proof in
a countersuit, see text accompanying notes 116-125 supra, the physician may also be
subject to a counter-counter-suit if his own suit fails. Reynolds, supra note 119, at 76.
Further, even if a physician prevails in a countersuit, his suit may have cost him more
than he can collect. The problem lies in proving damages. In a malpractice action a
patient's injuries may be obvious, whereas in a countersuit the physician's injuries,
which may be limited to loss of professional reputation or mental anguish, are obscure.
Malicious Prosecution, supra note 115, at 655-56. Finally, there is a general reluctance
among attorneys to handle countersuits. This arises in part from low anticipated
countersuit recoveries and from a "conspiracy of silence" toward going against a fellow
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makes the countersuit a relatively ineffective means of limiting the
number of medical malpractice suits. Nevertheless, awareness that
a countersuit is available to a physician who believes he has been
maliciously prosecuted may prevent the filing of claims that have not
been adequately searched and prepared."'
Considering the seriousness and continued existence of a medical
malpractice crisis,"' statutes limiting damages, and countersuits by
physicians do not provide the solution to the problem. Not only do
these two alternatives fail to fulfill the desire of the medical com-
munity to decrease malpractice actions, but more importantly, they
do not satisfy those patients who have been injured by a negligent
physician.
Statutes limiting damages are meant to ease the burden of rising
malpractice insurance rates, but in attempting to do so they have
placed arbitrary ceilings for recovery on those patients who are seri-
ously injured."' Not only do these statutes present practical problems
for malpractice litigants, but they are subject to attacks on their
constitutionality.' Countersuits by physicians are a novel approach
to the growing number of medical malpractice cases, although they
have so far proved impractical. General disfavor by the judiciary, the
difficult burden of proof, and low anticipated recoveries do not pro-
vide a good foundation for successful countersuits."5
The resolution to the medical malpractice crisis lies within the
medical and legal professions themselves. A greater awareness and
cooperation between the two professions will help to decrease mal-
practice actions in which attorneys with no medical expertise pass
judgment on elements of diagnosis and treatment."' One method of
attorney who conducted the medical malpractice action. Reynolds, supra note 119, at
77.
I.2 Berlin v. Nathan, Civ. No. 75-M2-542 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., June 1, 1976)
presents an example of a claim that was not adequately researched. Mrs. Nathan's
complaint against Dr. Berlin included an allegation that he had improperly handled
X-rays before they had dried. In fact, the hospital used automatic film processing
which made it impossible to handle a wet X-ray. Mrs. Nathan and her attorneys
admitted that they had not researched the basis for their allegations against Dr. Berlin.
Countersuit Victory, supra note 126, at 201.
I More than 20,000 malpractice claims are brought each year, and that figure is
increasing. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975 at 59.
'1 See text accompanying notes 14-45 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
u See text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
Frankel, Medico-Legal Communication, 6 WILLAMET E L. J. 193, 193 (1970).
See Eaton, The Need for Mutual Understanding in the Legal and Medico-Scientific
Professions, 8 MEDICINE, SCIENCE AND THE LAW 78 (1968).
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providing cooperation between the two professions is through the use
of review panels. Malpractice review panels are theoretically de-
signed to use experts from both professions to eliminate frivolous
actions and assist in trial preparation. If the legal profession recog-
nizes the problems that confront review panels and makes a genuine
effort to work with physicians to alleviate these problems, the panels
may succeed in providing stop-gap relief to the medical malpractice
crisis. However, review panels will not provide curative relief for the
difficulties inherent within our anachronistic system of health care
delivery that have manifested themselves through a malpractice cri-
sis. In addition to the need for cooperation between the medical and
legal professions, the medical profession itself will have to take an
active role in self-regulation to insure that those physicians who prac-
tice in a careless manner are properly disciplined and not allowed to
jeopardize the health of those who are in need of medical treatment. '
A successful campaign of self-regulation might preclude the need for
damage-limiting statutes, countersuits and review panels.
DAvm H. ALDRICH
" LEGISLAToR'S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 75.
